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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
RIGHT TO A FAm TRAL
Several recent decisions, resulting in reversed
convictions, have considered prosecutorial errors
during trial. In United States v. Ott, 489 F.2d 872
(7th Cir. 1973), the prosecution, in obtaining a
stolen check conviction vigorously asserted to the
trial court that a certain witness was not an in-
former; another prosecutor had recently argued in
a search and seizure appeal that the same witness
was a reliable informer." The Seventh Circuit held
that this misrepresentation, which would not have
been discovered but for the alertness of an appel-
late judge during oral argument, was so grave that
it required the reversal of the defendant's convic-
tion.2 Although the court noted that the original
misrepresentation had resulted from good faith
ignorance on the prosecutor's part, the court was
particularly disturbed by the prosecutor's appar-
ent willingness to let the misrepresentation con-
tinue, long after the pressure of trial had ended.
"Notwithstanding admitted knowledge of the
truth, and awareness of the argument advanced
in this court by appellant, and with the benefit of
the reflection that should attend the preparation
of an appellate brief and oral argument," the court
said, "the prosecutor was content to allow us to
appraise the issue on the basis of a false premise." 8
In United States v. Neznnan, 490 F.2d 139 (3d
Cir. 1974), the defendant was convicted for violat-
ing federal wiretap laws. In reversing the convic-
tion, the Third Circuit held that the totality of the
prosecution's errors had deprived the defendant of
a fundamentally fair trial.4 Among the errors de-
priving the defendant of a fair trial was the prose-
cutor's statement in closing argument of a conclu-
sion nowhere supported in the record-that a co-
defendant was not testifying for the prosecution in
exchange for plea-bargain leniency;5 another error
was the testimonial reference to another co-defend-
ants guilty plea.' The trial court's cautionary
instruction to disregard these two errors was
deemed insufficiently strong or specific to cure the
2489 F.2d at 873.
2 Id. at 875.
3Id.
4490 F.2d at 147-48.
5 Id. at 146.
' Id.
harmful effect. 7 The court stated that it was not
deciding the issue of whether any one of the errors
independently would be sufficient to require a new
trial; relying instead upon this "totality of the
circumstances" approach, the court concluded
that the errors had denied the ddendant a funda-
mentally fair trial.8 In applying the totality test,
the court considered the "vast investigative re-
sources of the United States Attorney's Office"
and said it was unfair to permit the government
to commit this type of error.9
The government's display to the jury of a suit-
case full of hashish to bolster the credibility of one
of its witnesses but irrelevant to the charges against
two defendants - the Falleys - resulted in a re-
versal of the Falleys' convictions in United States
v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1973). The indict-
ment charged the Faleys and three other defend-
ants with importing hashish into the United States
and of conspiring to violate a number of drug
laws. 0 The government was certain that there was
a smuggling conspiracy but it was unable to pro-
duce any hashish actually imported by the Falleys.
A government informer and accomplice of the de-
fendants testified that on two occasions he had
smuggled hashish which he delivered to the defend-
ants. In order to bolster the informer's testimony,
the government introduced, over the objection of
defense counsel, a suitcase full of hashish which
the informer testified was to be delivered to one
of the defendants only, and had nothing to do with
the Falleys." The Second Circuit said that while
the hashish was relevant to show the informer's
credibility, this relevance was outweighed by the
prejudice which might have been engendered in
the minds of the jury, which might easily have re-
lated the hashish to the Falleys.32 Although a limit-
ing instruction requested by the Falleys' counsel
was denied, the court noted that even if it had
been granted, it was highly questionable whether
the admission of the suitcase would then have been
proper. 8 Under the circumstances, the mere verbal
7 Id.
8 Id. at 147-48.
'Id.
10 489 F.2d at 35.
1 Id. at 36.
12Id. at 37.
11 Id. at 38.
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instruction by the trial court would not have un-
done the sensation created by the introduction
into the courtroom, of the large quantity of illegal
drugs, said the court. 4
Another prosecutorial blunder, in a federal lar-
ceny trial, resulted in the reversal of the defend-
ant's conviction in United States v. Harrington,
490 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1973). At the trial the Gov-
ernment elicited from several witnesses testimony
designed to show that the defendant had been in
possession of some of the stolen checks following
the commission of the crime. One of the witnesses,
however, was unable to make an in-court identifi-
cation of the defendant.15 The Government then
attempted to salvage this identification by having
the witness duplicate in court a previous out-of-
court identification he had made from "mug shot"
photographs. The Second Circuit held that the
manner in which the photographs were introduced
prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial
because the jury may well have gotten the impres-
sion that these mug shot photographs had been
taken in connection with the criminal charges
against the defendant.'" The courtroom contro-
versy surrounding their introduction, in full view
of the jury, strongly implied the photographs were,
in fact, mug shots, said the court.17 The demonstra-
ble need on the part of the Government to intro-
duce these photographs, while acknowledged by
the court, did not overcome the court's concern
for the possible prejudice resulting from the way
in which the jury's attention was focused on these
photographs. "Under the circumstances of this
case, in which a crucial government witness failed
to make an expected identification and in which
the other evidence against appellant was not over-
whelming, we believe," said the court, "that ap-
pellant was prejudiced." 18
In considering a number of remarks made by
certain prosecution witnesses in Montgomery v.
Conmonwealth, - Va. _, 200 S.E.2d 577 (1973),
the Supreme Court of Virginia said there is a class
of prejudicial utterances that per se necessitate a
14 Id.
1-5490 F.2d at 489.
16 Id. at 495-96.
17Id.
18 Id. In a dissenting opinion, judge Friendly stated
that the majority began with an overbroad statement of
the "other crimes" rule, unfairly second-guessed the
experienced trial judge's reasoned efforts to handle the
unexpected crisis, and overstated the possibility, con-
sidered by the trial judge, that the jury might have
thought the mug shots were taken in connection with
another offense. Id. at 497-99.
mistrial. One of the utterances considered in Mont-
gomery was that the defendant had admitted to
having killed a man in prison; another was that
the witness had known the defendant "since he
got out of prison;" and the third was the relation
of an overheard conversation about stealing some
dynamite to blow up the jail. All three utterances
were held to be irrelevant to the crime being tried
and highly prejudicial to the defendant's right to
a fair trial. The defendant's first degree murder
conviction was reversed 9 even though the trial
judge instructed the jury to disregard two of the
remarks.
20
The fair trial factor which kept prosecutors from
obtaining convictions in the above cases was also
partly responsible for the failure of the Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Ac-
tivities (popularly known as the Watergate Com-
mittee) to obtain court enforcement of its sub-
poena to the President for five White House tapes
that were already turned over to the appropriate
grand jury. Senate Select Committee v Nixon,
370 F.Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1974). The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia
noted that the potential prejudice to the rights of
Watergate figures facing prosecution as well as
those that may face prosecution outweighed the
pressing need claims underlying the Senate Select
Committee's request for the listed White House
tapes. Elaborating on this point the district court
said:
No one can doubt that, should the President be
forced to comply with the subpoena, public dis-
closure of these tapes would immediately generate
considerable publicity. While it is impossible, as
the Special Prosecutor points out, to assess the
precise impact of such publicity on the forthcom-
ing judicial proceedings, the risk exists that
it would bolster contentions that unbiased juries
cannot be impaneled for trial.
21
These cases evidence a strong judicial concern
to preserve the courtroom as a forum where the
parties involved can secure a fair trial. Government
prosecutors or anyone else who might impair an
accused's right to a fair trial would be well advised
to heed a recent warning uttered in a dissenting
opinion by Chief judge Swygert of the Seventh
Circuit who said: "Recently we have had before
us an increasing number of appeals involving al-
19 Va. -, 200 S.E.2d at 579.
20 Id. at 578-79.
21370 F.Supp. at 523.
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leged improper remarks by Government counsel
during their summations. Warnings as we gave in
United States v. Groomsn seem not to have been
heeded.... Accordingly, I think firmer and more
drastic steps are called for." United States v. Tit-
tenko, 490 F.2d 678, 682-83 (7th Cir. 1973). While
this warning was directed specifically to a particu-
lar type of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, Chief
Judge Swygert's admonition is equally applicable
to other frequently committed errors impairing
the right to a fair trial.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In 1972 the United States Supreme Court in
Argersinger v. Hamlin' purported to resolve part
of the ambiguity surrounding the right of indigents
to appointed counsel that had existed in the state
courts ever since the landmark decision in Gideon
v. Wainwright.2 Consistent with its chain of recent
decisions," the Court extended the right to counsel
to include misdemeanants. The right to counsel
guarantee, however, was not made absolute. In
so doing, the Court shifted the burden upon lower
courts to expand and clarify the right to counsel
principles. 26
Numerous lower courts have recently accepted
the opportunity to develop and clarify the right
to counsel guarantee. The Sixth Circuit in Mitchell
v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1973), held that
a state may not, "agreeably to the Constitution,
refuse to appoint counsel to assist an indigent de-
fendant in the preparation of an application for
discretionary direct appeal to the state supreme
court when non-indigent defendants customarily
employ counsel for this purpose." The court was
not persuaded by the government's argument that
because appellant had a previous appeal with the
aid of counsel the constitutional right to counsel
guarantee was satisfied. Burns v. Ohio7 was cited
- 454 F.2d 1308 (7th Cir. 1972).
w407 U.S. 25 (1972).
21372 U.S. 335 (1963).
25 See, e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967)
(probation revokee); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967) (suspect at an identification line-up); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (the juvenile); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (the "in-custody" sus-
pect); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (sus-
pected offender); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964) (the indicted suspect subject to surreptitious
interrogation).
2 See Comment, Argersinger v. Hamlin: For Better or
For Worse? 64 J. CmI. L. & C. 290 (1973); Note,
Sixth Amendment-Right to Counsel, Misdemeanor
.Prosecutions: Argersinger v. Hamlin, 403 U.S. 25 (1972),
J. Cm. L.C. & P.S. 473 (1972).
360 U.S. 252 (1959).
by the court for. the proposition that due process
and equal protection guarantees may be violated
when an indigent criminal defendant is disadvan-
taged at any stage of the appellate process. "The
rights of an injustly convicted defendant should
not be practically foreclosed merely because error
has survived prior appellate review, if other de-
fendants, similarly situated except for greater afflu-
ence, are afforded a better chance for another
appeal," said the court."
In Hutchins v. State, - Tenn. -, 504 S.W.2d
758 (1974), the Tennessee supreme court con-
strued a Tennessee statutory scheme for appeals
by indigents as making no distinction between
appeal and certiorari, and held that such scheme
gave indigents the absolute right to assistance of
counsel in pursuing both forms of post-conviction
relief. In so holding, the court pointed to the cur-
rent federal court policy which provides counsel
for both indigent appellants and certiorari peti-
tioners.29
In a case involving a parolee's habeas corpus
petition challenging the legality of his parole revo-
cation, one of the issues on appeal to the Indiana
supreme court was whether the defendant parolee
was entitled to representation by counsel in a
parole revocation hearing. Russell v. Doutilt,
- Ind. -, 304 N.E.2d 793 (1973). In resolving the
issue in the affirmative, the court expressed its
unhappiness 0 with the United States Supreme
Court rulings in this area in Gagnon v. Scarpelli"i
and Morrissey v. Brewer.3 2 In its observations with
respect to the appointment of counsel, the Gagnon
Court stated as follows:
We find no justification for a new inflexible con-
stitutional rule with respect to the requirement of
counsel. We think, rather, that the decision as to
the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-
case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by
the state authority charged with responsibility for
administering the probation and parole system. Al-
though the presence and participation of counsel
ill probably be both undesirable and constitu-
tionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings,
2 488 F.2d at 351-52.
29 This current policy in the federal courts is ex-
pressed in Doherty v. United States, 404 U.S. 28 (1971).
See Justice William 0. Douglas, concurring in the per
curiam opinion of the court, quoted in Doherty v.
United States. Id. at 29 from the Report on Criminal
Justice Act, 36 F.R.D. 285, 291 (1965).
30 - Ind. at -, 304 N.E.2d at 794-95.
"1411 U.S. 778 (1973).
• 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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there will remain certain cases inwhich fundamen-
tal fairness-the touchstone of due prcoess-will
require that the state provide at its expense counsel
for indigent probationers or parolees.;3
These statements, in their opinion, said the ma-
jority of the Indiana supreme court, "delude and
only becloud the issue and create uncertainty as
to what the law is." 1 In further criticism of the
Gagnon case-by-case approach, the court stated
that litigants ought not be subjected to the jeop-
ardy and liability of uncertainty which may remain
until the Supreme Court of the United States or
of Indiana decides the matter on a case-by-case
basis "the decision depending on the personal
thinking of those who happen to be judges at the
tine." ))3
Another application of the Gagnon and Morrissey
case-by-case standard led the West Virginia su-
preme court of appeals to conclude that two de-
fendant parolees in Dobbs v. Wallace, 201 S.E.2d
914 (W. Va. 1974), were not entitled to an attor-
ney at their revocation hearing. Although an attor-
ney was provided to the defendants on a different
theory,3 6 this case serves to illustrate the divergent
decisions resulting from the case-by-case standard,
as foreseen by the Indiana supreme court.,
1 411 U.S. at 790.
34 Ind. at -, 304 N.E.2d at 794.
1' Id. The majority's observations about the case-by-
case standard can readily be criticized as a firm grasp
of the obvious: absent a firm and inflexible rule, the
outcome of all cases is inherently uncertain. Concurring
in the result, Justices Hunter and Prentice agreed that
judicial opinions are not always crystal clear. However,
they did not consider Gagnon's case-by-case standard
as too unclear or intolerable. Id. at 795-96.
S6The petitioners had also argued that they were
denied their rights to equal protection of the law as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the consti-
tution. To support their argument, the petitioners
quoted part of a state statute which read: "When a
parolee is under arrest for violation of the conditions of
his parole, he shall be given a prompt and summary
hearing, at [sic] which the parolee and his counsel shall
be given an opportunity to attend." The basis of their
contention was that they were indigents and that, since
the quoted statute afforded parolees with sufficient
funds the right to hire counsel to represent them at
their parole revocation hearing, the constitution man-
dated the appointment of counsel for them. In agreeing
with these contentions, the court cited and relied on
Cottle v. Wainright, 477 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1973) and
Lane v. Attorney General of the United States, 477
F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1973) where the respective courts
had afforded assistance of counsel to defendants mak-
ing analogous contentions as the defendants in the in-
stant case. Two dissenting judges argued that the
statute allowing retained counsel for solvent parolees
could not possibly be interpreted as depriving insolvent
parolees anything.
87 See note 35, supra.
I Considering- the- right to counsel- in a context
different from the above cases, the Alabama su-
preme court in Davis v. State, _.= Ala. -, 291 So.2d
346 (1974),, held that the sixth amendment also
guaranteed a counsel of choice. The defendant's
retained counsel had two trials scheduled before
the same judge on the same day, but was not
allowed to try them in succession. When the trial
judge sent the defendant's case to another court-
room to be tried before another judge, the counsel
of choice was not allowed to handle the simul-
taneous-scheduling dilemma in any reasonable way
deipite counsel's request. The Alabama court
concluded that when the counsel of choice is pres-
ent and desires to represent the accused and is not
allowed to do so, the constitutional right to counsel
is violated and reversal must followP3
RIGHT TO EFFEcTIvE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL
While the right to counsel guaranteed by the
sixth amendment continues to be delineated by
both federal and state courts, the right to effective
assistance of counsel is rapidly surfacing as one of
the most serious problems confronting the criminal
justice system today. 9 Addressing itself to this
matter, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Woods,
- F.2d_, - (5th Cir. 1973), said that "physical
presence alone fails to satisfy the mandate of the
Sixth Amendment." The court noted that "it is
now firmly established that the right to counsel
means no less than the right to effective counsel." 4
0
These general comments by the Fifth Circuit
are uncontroverted. The difficulty exists in devis-
ing a meaningful and practical standard to deter-
mine the infringement of this principle. Two federal
courts recently grappled with this difficulty. First,
the standard that a federal defendant had not
received ineffective assistance of appointed counsel
in violation of the sixth amendment unless the
trial constituted "a farce and a mockery of justice"
was re-examined by the Sixth Circuit in Beasley v.
United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974). The
court reviewed all of the United States Supreme
Court's holdings on effective assistance from Powell
'3 _ Ala. __, - So.2d at _.
'3 Speaking to the National College of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers on January 4-6, 1974, Federal District
judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. voiced agreement with
the recent .expressions by Chief Justice Burger that in-
effective assistance of counsel is one of the criminal
justice system's greatest problems today. 14 Cr. L. 2326.
t0 F.2d at .
[V l. 65
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v. Alabama to McMann v. Richardson " and con-
cluded that the "farce and mockery" test should be
abandoned as a meaningful standard for testing
sixth amendment rights. In establishing a new
standard, the Sixth Circuit followed the Fifth and
District of Columbia Circuits' formulation requir-
ing appointment of counsel "reasonably likely to
render and rendering reasonably effective assist-
ance." 43 In its discussion of this standard, the
court said that "defense counsel must perform at
least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and
skill in the criminal law and must conscientiously
protect his client's interest, undeflected by con-
flicting considerations." " In the other case,
Johnson v. Vincent, 370 F.Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), the United States District Court for South-
ern New York granted a federal habeas corpus,
vacating a state murder conviction, because of
defendant counsel's ineffective appellate assistance.
Applying a standard similar to the one set out
above in Beasley, the district court said that any-
one in the field would have known enough to raise
on appeal the failure to give a lesser offense instruc-
tion, which was saved by objection at trial. The
court noted that the defendant "would almost
certainly have succeeded in obtaining a reversal of
his con- iction had it not been for his lawyer's
misfeasance." 41 Conceding that this misfeasance
41287 U.S. 45 (1932).
42 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
43 491 F.2d at 696.
44 Id.
41370 F. Supp. at 387.
stemmed not from neglect or indifference but from
"sheer ignorance of the law," the court said the
consequences to the defendant were nevertheless
identical. Commenting on the appointment of
defendant's counsel, the district court said it was
"appalled that the representation of a convicted
murderer, facing a minimum of fifteen years in
prison, should be entrusted to a lawyer whose
acquaintance with criminal law was so slight as to
be non-existent." 41
The merits of the analogous standards adopted
in Beasley and Johnson remain to be tested further.
Both standards attempt to gauge the ineffective-
ness of counsel by examining his work to deter-
mine if it is within the normal range of competence
of counsel in criminal cases. This approach sug-
gests a case-by-case analysis of alleged ineffective
legal representation; a corollary to this suggestion
is the uncertainty that generally accompanies case-
by-case approaches. However, as the courts con-
tinue to use these standards it can be reasonably
expected that the "normal range of competence"
will be more clearly defined.
46
1d. at 388. The defendant's attorney was asso-
ciated with law firms whose practice consisted almost
entirely of personal injury litigation. In the course of
that practice, he had handled only one appeal. The
entirety of his prior exposure to criminal law consisted
of a one semester course at Columbia, and two or three
criminal appeals he had undertaken on appointment.
He admitted that none of these appeals involved a
trial transcript; they were rather undertaken on behalf
of prisoners who had entered guilty pleas and who
then sought to contest the voluntariness of the plea
or the severity of sentence.
